Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/18 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003200100001-4

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO REMAIN IN VIENNA AS A RESULT OF A SOVIET BLOCKADE

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The present Austrian regime, backed by the Western Powers, is a disadvantage to the USSR. The USSR would therefore seek to isolate Austria from western political and economic influence, and ultimately attempt to gain complete control over the country with a view to integrate Austria into the eastern bloc.

In the event that the USSR should decide that the US is susceptible to additional pressure, the Kremlin would employ pressure tactics wherever desirable. It is by no means certain that the USSR would take action in Austria. Although a blockade of Vienna and partition of Austria would improve the Soviet political position in eastern Austria, it would be harmful to Soviet economic interests.

A Soviet decision to blockade Vienna and force a partition of Austria would be based primarily upon a Soviet estimate of the future course of US/USSR relations after the conclusion of the current discussions on the Berlin issue. Specifically, such a decision would be based on a Soviet estimate of US readiness to resist militarily any further Soviet pressure. UN consideration of the Berlin issue would not in itself substantially influence Soviet tactics in Austria.



2. ASSUMPTIONS.

Assumption I: The abandonment of Vienna by the Western Powers as the result of a Soviet blockade of Vienna.

Assumption justified: In the event of e. blockade, the Western Powers could remain in Vienna only by force.

- a. Rail, road, and water transportation would be under Soviet control.
- b. Airlift facilities could not be sufficient.
 - (1) Both the US airport and the combined British-French airport are in the Soviet zone and would be under Soviet control.
 - (2) While facilities are available for construction of an emergency airstrip in the US sector, it is estimated that this could handle only the minimum requirements of US forces. It would be impossible to supply the other occupation forces or the civilian population through use of this strip.
 - (3) Construction of two C-54 airstrips in the British sector would require 40 days. At present no troops or equipment are available for such a project.
- 2. Substantially all electric power, all water, and most of the gas in Vienna would be under Soviet control.
- d. All telecommunication lines between Vienna and the western somes would be under Soviet commonly.

Assumption II: The continued occupation by the Western Powers of the Western zones of Austria.



3. CONSEQUENCES.

- a. International Effects.
 - (1) Enhancement of War Danger.
 - (a) Further development of E-W rift.
 - (b) Abandonment of Vienna would be a retreat before Russian pressure.
 - The US has committed itself formally to the support of a popularly elected Austrian Government. Western guarantees to a strongly pro-Western Government and people would, in effect, be abandoned.
 - ii. A blockade of Vienna would be the most aggressive action yet undertaken by the USSR against the West.
 - (2) Adverse Effect on US Prestige and Position in Europe.
 - (a) Abandonment of the pro-Western political entity of Austria might be decisive in weakening the resistance of inhabitants of Berlin to Russian pressure.
 - (b) Loss in prestige might require greater US arms aid to Western European countries.
- b. Effects in Austria.
 - (1) Political Effects.
 - (a) Possibility of concluding a treaty with Austria would vanish.
 - (b) Partition of Austria would result. Present Austrian government can be expected to remain pro-Western and would not subject itself to Soviet dictation, choosing rather to move



to the western zone, claiming jurisdiction over all Austria.

- (c) In spite of Western Power withdrawal from Vienna,

 Austrians in the three western zones would continue to
 support Western policies.
 - i. Western zone Austrians would probably appreciate
 the logistic impossibility of remaining in Vienna
 under a land blockade.
 - ii. Immediate action could be initiated to present the case to the UN emphasizing the abrogation of agreements pertaining to Austria.
 - iii. The US could mitigate the adverse reaction to such a withdrawel by demonstrating firm opposition to Soviet aggression in western Austria.
 - iv. Increased economic and military aid would have to be sent to western Austria.
- (d) The USSR would probably assume administrative control of the eastern zone, thus depriving the legally constituted Austrian government of its authority in that area, and would force a satellite government on eastern Austria.
 - i. The majority of Austrian people in the eastern zone would not voluntarily support a Soviet-created government.
 - ii. Political repression would be forcefully pursued by Soviet authorities.



- iii. A satellite eastern Austria would be linked by the USSR with the eastern bloc.
- (2) <u>Economic Effects</u>: serious economic dislocation would result from partition.
 - (a) The interdependence between eastern and western Austria is such that economically, neither could exist isolated from the other. (Population of eastern Austria: 3,448,000; western Austria: 3,497,000).
 - (b) In totaling the agricultural, raw material, and industrial assets of the two areas, the western zones have the advantage.
 - i. The Soviet zone normally produces two-thirds of the grain, potatoes, and sugar crops; the western zones produce two-thirds of the livestock and forest products.
 - ii. The eastern zone contains all oil and oil processing industries; the western zones contain all metal ore deposits, about 90% of the coal (brown), and the great majority of electric power sources and facilities.
 - iii. The Soviet zone would have greater capacity and production in the fields of electrical and electronics equipment; in capital equipment, however, the western zones enjoy the advantage.
 - iv. Most of the finishing plants for consumer goods are located in the eastern zone; the majority of factories for semi-finished goods are located in the western zones.



of the population of the entire country) in the eastern zone constitutes a considerable drag on the economy of that zone.

